Abstract-We show that stand-alone statistically secure random oblivious transfer protocols based on two-party stateless primitives are statistically universally composable. I.e. they are simulatable secure with an unlimited adversary, an unlimited simulator and an unlimited environment machine. Our result implies that several previous oblivious transfer protocols in the literature which were proven secure under weaker, noncomposable definitions of security can actually be used in arbitrary statistically secure applications without lowering the security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oblivious transfer (OT) [1] is a primitive of central importance in modern cryptography and implies secure computation [2] , [3] . Several flavors of OT were proposed, but they are all equivalent [4] . In this work we focus on the so-called one-out-of-two random oblivious transfer. This is a two-party primitive in which a sender (Alice) gets two uniformly random bits b 0 , b 1 and a receiver (Bob) gets a uniformly random choice bit c and b c . Bob remains ignorant about b c . On the other hand, Alice cannot learn the choice bit c.
A very large number of OT protocols are known in the stand-alone setting, based on various assumptions (both computational and physical), but this notion does not guarantee security when multiple copies of the protocol are executed, or when the OT protocols are used as building blocks within other protocols. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs, as the major utility of OT is in the modular designing of larger protocols. Following the simulation paradigm used in [5] to define the seminal notion of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, many simulation-based definitions of security for multi-party protocols were proposed (e.g. [2] , [6] ) and they guarantee that the protocols are sequentially composable [7] , however this paradigm of security does not guarantee general composability of the protocols. UC-security [8] emerges as a very desirable notion of security for OT since it guarantees that the security of the protocol holds even when the OT scheme is concurrently composed with an arbitrary set of protocols. UC-security is a very powerful notion of security that allows to fully enjoy the nice properties of OT within other protocols.
Some questions about the equivalence of stand-alone and composable security notions in the case of statistically secure protocols were studied [9] , [10] . In general, these security notions are not equivalent [10] . Therefore, it is an interesting question to study if there are restricted scenarios where this equivalence holds.
Our Results: In this paper we show that random OT protocols that are based on certain stateless two-party functionalities and that match a certain list of information-theoretical security properties are not only secure in a simulation-based way, but are actually UC-secure. Note that Random OT can be straightforwardly used to obtain OT for arbitrary inputs in a composable way [11] . Note also that most OT protocols based on two-party stateless functionalities already internally run a random OT protocol and then use derandomization techniques to obtain OT for arbitrary inputs. We think that this approach is interesting because, in this scenario, a protocol designer can worry only about meeting the list-based security notion and the protocol inherits the UC-security. The setting studied in this paper covers the case of statistically secure protocols based on noisy channels, cryptogates and pre-distributed correlated data. As a consequence of our result, several previously proposed protocol implementing oblivious transfer that were proven secure in weaker models automatically have their security upgraded to a simulation-based, composable one for free [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] .
A. Related Work
OT can be constructed based both on generic computational assumptions such as the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations [26] , [27] and on the computational hardness of many specific problems such as factoring [1] , DiffieHellman [28] , [29] , LWE [30] , variants of LPN [31] and McEliece assumptions [32] , [33] . However, the focus of this work is on statistically secure OT. When aiming for statistical security, OT can be based on noisy channels [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , cryptogates [21] , [22] , predistributed correlated data [11] , [23] , [17] , the bounded storage model [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] and on hardware tokens [24] , [25] .
Canetti and Fischlin [38] showed that OT cannot be UCrealized in the plain model, so additional setup assumptions are required. UC-secure OT protocols were initially constructed in the common reference string (CRS) model [39] , [40] , [30] . In the CRS model there exists an honestly generated random string that is available to the parties (the simulator can generate its own string as long as it looks indistinguishable from the honestly generated one). In the public key infrastructure model, Damgård and Nielsen [41] proposed an OT protocol that is UC-secure against adaptive adversaries under the assumption that threshold homomorphic encryption exists. Katz [42] proved that two-party and multi-party computation are possible assuming a tamper-proof hardware.
The question about the equivalence of stand-alone and composable security definitions for statistically secure protocols has been previously addressed in [9] , [10] , where it was proven that the equivalence does not hold in general. In [43] it was proven that perfectly secure OT protocols according to a list of properties are sequentially composable, this result being extended to statistical security in [44] .
It was shown that for statistically secure commitment schemes based on two-party stateless primitives stand-alone security implies UC-security [45] . While this result implies the possibility of building UC-secure OT protocols based on these commitment protocols, this is not the most efficient way of obtaining OT and it does not prove any additional security property about the existing OT protocols.
Even if the resources available to the parties to implement OT are asymmetric, Wolf and Wullschleger [46] showed a very simple way to reverse the OT's direction (indeed all complete two-party functionalities are reversible as proved recently by Khurana et al. [47] ).
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
Domains of random variables will be denoted by calligraphic letters, the random variables by upper case letters and the realizations by lower case letters. For a random variables X over X and Y over Y, P X : X → [0, 1] with x∈X P X (x) = 1 denotes the probability distribution of X, P X (x) := y∈Y P XY (x, y) the marginal probability distribution and P X|Y (x|y) := P XY (x, y)/P Y (y) the conditional probability distribution if P Y (y) = 0. The statistical distance δ(P X , P Y ) between P X and P Y with alphabet X is given by
We say P X and P Y are ε-close if δ(P X , P Y ) ≤ ε. Following Crépeau and Wullschleger [44] , let the statistical information of X and Y given Z be defined as
B. The UC Framework
Here we briefly review the main concepts of the UC framework, for more details please refer to the original work of Canetti [8] . In the UC framework, the security of a protocol to carry out a certain task is ensured in three phases: 1) One formalizes the framework, i.e., the process of executing a protocol in the presence of an adversary and an environment machine.
2) One formalizes an ideal protocol for carrying out the task in an ideal protocol using a "trusted party". In the ideal protocol the trusted party captures the requirements of the desired task and the parties do not communicate among themselves. 3) One proves that the real protocol emulates the ideal protocol, i.e., for every adversary in the real model there exists an ideal adversary (also known as the simulator) in the ideal model such that no environment machine can distinguish if it is interacting with the real or the ideal world.
The environment in the UC framework represents all activity external to the running protocol, so it provides inputs to the parties running the protocol and receives the outputs that the parties generate during the execution of the protocol. As stated above the environment also tries to distinguish between attacks on real executions of the protocol and simulated attacks against the ideal functionality. If no environment can distinguish the two situations, the real protocol emulates the ideal functionality. Proving that a protocol is secure in the UC framework provides the following benefits:
1) The ideal functionality describes intuitively the desired properties of the protocol.
2) The protocols are secure under composition.
3) The security is retained when the protocol is used as a sub-protocol to replace an ideal functionality that it emulates.
a) The ideal world: An ideal functionality F represents the desired properties of a given task. Conceptually, F is treated as a local subroutine by the several parties that use it, and so the communication between the parties and F is supposedly secure (i.e., messages are sent by input and output tapes). The ideal protocol also involves a simulator S, an environment Z on input z and a set of dummy parties that interacts as defined below. Whenever a dummy party is activated with input x, it writes x onto the input tape of F . Whenever the dummy party is activated with value x on its subroutine output tape, it writes x on subroutine output tape of Z. The simulator S has no access to the contents of messages sent between dummy parties and F , and it should send corruption messages directly to F , who is responsible for determining the effects of corrupting any dummy party. The ideal functionality receives messages from the dummy parties by reading its input tape and sends messages to them by writing to their subroutine output tape. In the ideal protocol there is no communication among the parties. The environment Z can set the inputs to the parties and read their outputs, but cannot see the communication with the ideal functionality.
b) The real world: In the real world, the protocol π is executed by parties P 1 , . . . , P n with some adversary A and an environment machine Z with input z. Z can set the inputs for the parties and see their outputs, but not the communication among the parties. The parties can invoke subroutines, pass inputs to them and receive outputs from them. They can also write messages on the incoming communication tape of the adversary. These messages may specify the identity of the final destination of the message. A can send messages to any Alice's Check-in: Upon receiving (DISTRIBUTE, sid, . . . ) from Alice, if Alice is honest sample uniformly random b 0 , b 1 ∈ {0, 1}; otherwise set the bits b 0 , b 1 as specified in Alice's message. Record (sid, b 0 , b 1 ) and ignore future (DISTRIBUTE, sid, . . . ) from Alice.
Bob's Check-in: Upon receiving (DISTRIBUTE, sid, . . . ) from Bob, if Bob is honest sample a uniformly random c ∈ {0, 1}; otherwise set the bit c as specified in Bob's message. Record (sid, c) and ignore future (DISTRIBUTE, sid, . . . ) from Bob. party (A delivers the message). In addition, they may use the ideal functionalities that are provided to the real protocol. A can communicate with Z and the ideal functionalities that are provided to the real protocol. A also controls the corrupt parties (the environment always knows which parties are corrupted).
c) The adversarial model: The network is asynchronous without guaranteed delivery of messages. The communication is public, but authenticated (i.e., the adversary cannot modify the messages). The adversary is active in its control over corrupted parties. Any number of parties can be corrupted. Finally, the adversary, the environment and the simulator are allowed unbounded complexity. This assumption on the computational power of the simulator somehow weakens our result as the composition theorem cannot be applied several times if the real adversary were restricted to polynomial time, because the "is at least as secure as" relation cannot be proven to be transitive anymore. However, arbitrary composition is allowed when considering statistically secure protocols and this situation is common in the literature when proving general results on the composability of statistically secure protocols [10] , [9] , [44] , [43] .
d) Realizing an ideal functionality:
A protocol π statistically UC-realizes an ideal functionality F if for any reallife adversary A there exists a simulator S such that no environment Z, on any input z, can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with A and parties running π in the real-life process, or it is interacting with S and F in the ideal protocol. This means that, from the point of view of the environment, running protocol π is statistically indistinguishable from the ideal world with F . e) The Oblivious Transfer Functionality: We present in Figure 1 the one-out-of-two bit random oblivious transfer functionality F ROT . The sender will be denote by Alice and the receiver by Bob.
C. Setup Assumption
In this work we consider the scenario in which Alice and Bob have access to the functionality F P V,W |X,Y that given inputs x ∈ X from Alice and y ∈ Y from Bob samples the outputs v ∈ V and w ∈ W according to the conditional probability distribution P V,W |X,Y , and gives the outputs v and w to Alice and Bob, respectively. The functionality F P V,W |X,Y is described in Figure 2 . Note that this functionality captures setup assumptions that are commonly used for obtaining statistically secure OT protocols, such as the existence of a stateless noisy channel between the parties, cryptogates and pre-distributed correlated data.
III. RANDOM OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER BASED ON STATISTICALLY SECURE TWO PARTY STATELESS FUNCTIONALITIES
In this section we define a stand-alone security model for random OT protocols that achieve statistical security by using F P V,W |X,Y as a setup assumption. Alice and Bob have two resources available between them:
• a bidirectional authenticated noiseless channel denoted as F AUTH and • the functionality F P V,W |X,Y . We model the probabilistic choices of Alice by a random variable coins Alice and those of Bob by a random variable coins Bob , so that we can use deterministic functions in the protocol. As usual, we assume that the noiseless messages exchanged by the players and their personal randomness are taken from {0, 1}
* .
a) Protocol π: Alice and Bob interact and in the end of the execution Alice gets (b 0 , b 1 ) and Bob gets (c, b c ), for b 0 , b 1 , c ∈ {0, 1} picked uniformly at random. The security parameter is n, and determines how many times the parties can use the functionality F P V,W |X,Y : in the i-th round Alice and Bob input symbols x i and y i to the functionality F P V,W |X,Y , which generates the outputs v i and w i according to P V,W |X,Y and delivers them to Alice and Bob, respectively. Let x i , y i , v i and w i denote the vectors of these variables until i-th round. The parties can use F AUTH at any moment. Let trans denote all the noiseless messages exchanged between the players.
We call the view of Bob all the data in his possession, i.e. y n , w n , c, coins Bob and trans, and denote it by view Bob . view Alice is defined similarly. We denote the output of the (possibly malicious) parties Alice and Bob by output Alice and output Bob , respectively. The stand-alone definition of security that is henceforth considered in this paper follows the lines of Crépeau and Wullschleger [44] . The protocol is said to be secure if there exists an ǫ that is a negligible function of the security parameter n and is such that the following properties 
IV. UC-SECURITY IMPLICATION
In this section we address the question of whether random OT protocols that are secure according to the definitions of Section III also enjoy statistical UC-security. We will show that this is indeed the case. Intuitively this follows from the fact that the security in those protocols is based on the correlated randomness that is provided by the functionality F P V,W |X,Y to Alice and Bob. Since in the ideal world the simulator controls F P V,W |X,Y , it can leverage this knowledge in order to extract the outputs of the corrupted parties and forward them to the random oblivious transfer functionality F ROT , thus allowing the ideal execution to be indistinguishable from the real execution from the environment's point of view. First we prove some lemmas that will be used later on to prove the main result of this work.
We first show that in any random OT protocol that is standalone secure, if Bob is honest, then given Alice's input to and output from the functionality F P V,W |X,Y and all the noiseless communication exchanged by Alice and Bob through F AUTH it is possible to extract both outputs that Bob would get with c = 0 and c = 1 in the random OT protocol.
Lemma 4.1: Let π be a stand-alone secure random OT protocol and let Bob be honest. Given Alice's input to and output from F P V,W |X,Y and all the noiseless communication exchanged by Alice and Bob through F AUTH during the execution of π, with overwhelming probability it is possible to extract the output that Bob would get both in the case that c = 0 and c = 1.
Proof: Lets consider an execution of the protocol π in which Bob has random coins coins Bob and gets output Bob = (c, d) for d ∈ {0, 1} and uniformly random c ∈ {0, 1} (as the protocol is stand-alone secure). Denote by m the set of messages exchanged between Alice and F P V,W |X,Y concatenated with the noiseless messages between Bob and Alice. We claim that there should exist coins Bob = coins Bob so that for the same m, if Bob executed the protocol with coins Bob he should have been able with overwhelming probability to get output Bob = (c, d) with c = c and d ∈ {0, 1}. If that were not the case, Alice would know that Bob is unable to obtain a valid output d when the choice bit is c, thus gaining knowledge on the choice bit and breaking the protocol security. Given that
we get δ(P output Alice C , P output Alice P C ) ≤ ǫ, and so there are events E 1 and E 2 such that
P output Alice C|E1 = P output Alice |E2 P C|E2 .
Therefore if E 1 and E 2 happen, then output Alice does not provide information about C and coins Bob should exist. Thus, given m we are left with an extraction procedure. One just computes coins Bob and coins Bob that for this m produce outputs output Bob and output Bob , respectively, and simulates the protocol execution for each specified Bob's randomness. We now prove that given access to the messages that Bob exchanges with Alice and F P V,W |X,Y , there is a point in the protocol execution in which it is possible to extract the choice bit c and still equivocate b 0 , b 1 to any value, i.e., it is possible to find an Alice' view that is compatible with the current view of Bob and the new values of b 0 and b 1 .
Lemma 4.2:
Let π be a stand-alone secure random OT protocol and let Alice be honest. Given access to all messages that Bob's exchanges with F P V,W |X,Y and all the noiseless communication exchanged by Alice and Bob through F AUTH during the execution of π, with overwhelming probability it is possible to extract the choice bit c at some point of the execution of the protocol π. Additionally at this point it is still possible to change b 0 and b 1 to any desired values.
Proof: We first prove that there is a point in the protocol execution where we can extract the choice bit given the messages that Bob exchanged with Alice and the functionality F P V,W |X,Y . Let m denote these messages in a given protocol execution. Let M(0) denote the set of messages that allow Bob to obtain the bit b 0 with overwhelming probability (the probability taken over coins Alice , coins Bob and the randomness of F P V,W |X,Y ). And let M(1) be defined similarly for b 1 . From the stand-alone security for Alice we have that
and so we get that m with overwhelming probability (over coins Alice and the randomness of F P V,W |X,Y ) cannot be in both M(0) and M(1), since this fact would imply that the resulting protocol would be insecure for Alice. This fact gives us a procedure for obtaining the choice bit c given m. We just check if m is in M(0) or M(1).
We now turn to the equivocation property. From the previous reasoning, we know that there should exist a point in the protocol where Bob sends a message to Alice that fixes the choice bit (i.e. the choice bit can be extracted from his messages from/to Alice and F P V,W |X,Y ). Let i be the index of such message. Suppose the i-th message is the very last one in the protocol. Then Bob has all the information necessary to compute his output even before sending the i-th message. As the choice bit is only fixed in the next message, Bob should be able to compute both b 0 and b 1 , breaking Alice's security. Thus, the i-th message should not be the last one. We now use two lemmas to prove our main result: Theorem 4.3: Any stand-alone statistically secure protocol π of random oblivious transfer based on F AUTH and F P V,W |X,Y UC-realizes F ROT .
Proof: We construct the simulator S as follows. S runs a simulated copy of A in a black-box way, plays the role of the ideal functionality F P V,W |X,Y and simulates a copy of the hybrid interaction of π for the simulated adversary A. In addition, S forwards the messages between Z and A. Below we describe the procedures of the simulator in each occasion:
Only Alice is corrupted: S samples the randomness coins Bob of the simulated Bob and proceeds with the simulated execution of the protocol π by producing his noiseless messages as well as his inputs y i ∈ Y to F P V,W |X,Y . Additionally, once the inputs x i ∈ X and y i ∈ Y to F P V,W |X,Y are fixed, S simulates the outputs of the functionality F P V,W |X,Y and sends v i to A. As S plays the role of F P V,W |X,Y , when the execution is done, S extracts the output bits b 0 , b 1 of the corrupted Alice using the result of lemma 4.1 and forwards b 0 , b 1 to F ROT . S then allows F ROT to deliver the output.
Only Bob is corrupted: S samples the randomness coins Alice of the simulated Alice and proceeds with the simulated execution of the protocol π by producing her noiseless messages as well as her inputs x i ∈ X to F P V,W |X,Y . Additionally, once the inputs x i ∈ X and y i ∈ Y to F P V,W |X,Y are fixed, S simulates the outputs of the functionality F P V,W |X,Y and sends w i to A. Then using the result of lemma 4.2, S extracts the choice bit c of the corrupted Bob, inputs c to F ROT , receives b c and finishes the simulated protocol execution in such way that the received bit in the hybrid interaction b ′ c is equal to the received bit in the ideal protocol b c with overwhelming probability.
Neither party is corrupted: S samples the randomness coins Alice and coins Bob and proceeds with the simulated execution of the protocol π by simulating the noiseless messages as well as the inputs/outputs of We analyze below the probabilities of the events that can result in different views for the environment Z between the real world execution with the protocol π and the adversary A, and the ideal world execution with functionality F ROT and the simulator S:
• When only Alice is corrupted, Z's view in the real and ideal worlds are equal if: (1) S succeeds to extract both of Alice's outputs bits b 0 , b 1 to forward to F ROT ; (2) A does not learn the choice bit c ′ in the simulated protocol execution. By lemma 4.1, the extraction works with overwhelming probability. By the stand-alone security, with overwhelming probability A does not learn c ′ .
• When only Bob is corrupted, Z's view in the real and ideal worlds are equal if: (1) S succeeds to extract the bit c and finish the protocol in such way that the received bit b • When both parties are corrupted, S's procedures perfectly emulate the hybrid execution for the adversary A. We conclude that since all events that can result in different views have negligible probabilities, the protocol π UC-realizes F ROT .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we prove that random oblivious transfer protocols based on two-party stateless functionalities matching a list of security properties are universally composable when unbounded simulators are allowed. As previously commented, this assumption on the simulator gives us secure universal composability with other statistically secure protocols. The restriction to random oblivious transfer protocols is not restrictive (since random OT can be used to obtain OT for arbitrary inputs [11] , proving the composability of such reduction is straightforward). And most of the OT protocols based on twoparty stateless functionalities are in fact designed to initially run an internal random OT protocol and then derandomize the values. In this case the universally composability implication can be applied directly to the inner random OT protocol. However, it is an interesting problem to generalize the results presented here to arbitrary OT. Our result immediately imply that several previously proposed OT protocols can have their security upgraded for free [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [11] , [23] , [24] , [25] .
